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Epistemic Injustice in Utterance Interpretation1.
1. Introduction.
There has been much recent discussion of the harmful role prejudicial stereotypes play in
our communicative exchanges.  For example, Miranda Fricker (2007) explores a type of
injustice (testimonial injustice) which arises when the credibility judgements we make
about speakers are informed by prejudicial stereotypes.  One might, according to Fricker,
wrong someone by assigning them a low credibility due to their race or gender.   This
discussion has produced many important insights.  However, it has so far focused on the
role stereotypes play in our epistemic assessments of communicative actions, rather than
our  interpretations  of  such  actions  (interpretations  which  underlay  our  epistemic
assessments)2.  Yet, the same prejudicial stereotypes that infect credibility judgements
can also infect our interpretation. For example, imagine a black man wrongly suspected
of rape in depression era Alabama. Suppose that he is  overheard saying 'she seemed
vulnerable' whilst describing his motivations for being at his accuser's home.  Given the
context and the prejudices of the time (with black men being seen as predatory toward
white women), he would likely be misinterpreted as stating that he saw her as an easy
target. Call this 'Interpretative Injustice'. This paper explores the sources of interpretative
injustice, and considers some of the harms to which it gives rise. There are several harms
caused by interpretative injustice.  Firstly, it silences.  It prevents certain groups from
being  able  to  efficiently  communicate  knowledge  to  other  (perhaps  more  powerful)
groups.   Secondly,  it  results  in  speakers  being  held  epistemically  responsible  for
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this journal.  I would also like audiences at the St Andrews Friday Seminar, and the Arché work in 
progress seminar where this work was presented.  This research was supported by the United Kingdom 
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2 This is not to say that the topic of miscommunication in general ha been ignored in this literature.  For
example, José Medina (2013) urges a focus on the dynamics and mechanisms of communication, but
focuses  on  the  larger  scale  dynamics  of  intergroup  communication,  as  well  as  the  differing  and
dynamic availability or hermeneutical resources within and between different social groups.. Rather, it
is the role of prejudicial stereotypes in generating miscommunication which has been ignored.  My
interest here lays with smaller scale interactions, and the cognitive mechanisms underlying particular
instances of communication. 
2propositions  they never  intended to  communicate.   And thirdly,  it  contributes  to  the
illusion that prejudicial low credibility judgements are epistemically justified. I close by
arguing  that  if  Miranda  Fricker's  strategy  for  treating  testimonial  injustice  is
implemented  in  absence  of  a  treatment  of  interpretative  injustice  then  we  risk
epistemically harming hearers with little benefit to  speakers.  Thus testimonial injustice
and interpretative injustice are best treated in tandem. 
2. Interpretative Injustice.
Fricker's brand of epistemic injustice arises as a result of the way in which our credibility
judgements  are  guided  by potentially  prejudicial  stereotypes.  Credibility  judgements
occur late in the process of testimonial belief formation. Other stages in this process are
likewise guided by stereotypes.  In particular, our interpretation of utterances themselves
will often be guided by stereotypes3. This is especially true in cases involving context
sensitivity,  loose  talk,  unfamiliar  dialects  or  accents,  noisy  environments,  and
implicature.   In  such  situations  we  must  appeal  to  our  knowledge  of  the  context,
including  what  we  know  about  the  speaker  (their  likely  goals,  interests,  beliefs,
background, and intelligence) in order to reach a verdict on what proposition the are
intending to communicate. 
Interpretative injustice is the phenomenon whereby a hearer's employment of prejudicial
stereotypes results in the hearer attributing a message to the speaker when the speaker
never intended to convey that message. As we will see, these prejudicial stereotypes may
affect  both  speech  perception  and  the  assignment  of  meaning.   Thus,  interpretative
injustice is a broad phenomenon.  I mostly follow Fricker's use of the term 'prejudicial
stereotype' to mean, roughly, a generalisation which embodies a judgement about a social
group which is not properly evidence responsive4.  That is,  one harbours a prejudicial
stereotype  if  one  harbours  a  (usually  negative)  generalisation  (or  set  of  associations
which embody a generalisation) about a particular social group, and one's harbouring of
3 My focus here will be on our understanding of the content of utterances.  However, our understanding
of the types of act performed can also be shaped by misleading stereotypes.  For example, we may
mistakenly interpret an order as a request.  Such cases are discussed in Kukla (forthcoming). 
4 The processes underlying our understanding and credibility judgements are likely to be associative.
However,  we  can  think  of  sets  of  associations  as  embodying  generalisations.   For  example,  the
association of 'black' with 'crime', 'gun', and 'drugs' would embody a generalisation about black people
e.g. 'black people are criminals'. 
3that generalisation is not sensitive to the available evidence.  If an aspect of our social
practice systematically, unfairly, and disproportionately harms certain social groups, then
in cases where members of these groups have been harmed by the social practice they
have been victims  of  injustice.  Interpretative  injustice  gives  rise  to  numerous harms
(discussed in section five).  These harms are experienced disproportionately by particular
disadvantaged social groups. Moreover, in cases where these harms are experienced as a
result of interpretative injustice it will be the hearer's lack of evidence responsiveness
which gives rise to the harm.  Thus it seems that the harm is unfairly inflicted upon the
speaker (the miscommunication does not result from either a fault in the speaker or mere
bad luck, it arises out of a fault in the hearer5). Moreover, these harms will constitute part
of a wider web of harms which the disadvantaged individual is systematically subjected
to. 
For the sake of clarity, it is worth considering some related concepts and cases to see
what does and does not fall under the umbrella of interpretative injustice. Firstly, I do not
consider  interpretative  injustice,  as  discussed  here,  to  include  cases  where  a  hearer
reaches the correct judgement about what a speaker intended to communicate, but does
do on the basis of a misleading stereotype. Such cases seem to be instances of lucky
interpretation,  and  may  be  interesting  in  their  own  right.   However,  I  will  not  be
discussing them further, as there is no misinterpretation and the audience is not harmed. 
Also  of  potential  interest  is  the  more  general  case  where  someone  misinterprets  a
communicative act on the basis of a false belief or presupposition. Interpretative injustice
is a subspecies of this phenomenon, and many of the things I say about the harms of
interpretative  injustice  will  carry  over.   However,  I  am  concerned  primarily  with
misinterpretation caused by prejudicial stereotypes or associations, because this is a more
systematic phenomenon and patterns with other forms of injustice. 
What  about  cases  in  which  the  speaker  may not  have  been  understood  even  by an
unprejudiced audience?  One might think that in such cases the hearer's prejudice does
not  harm  the  speaker,  meaning  that  no  injustice  occurs.  This  would  be  a  mistake.
5 This is  not  to say that  audiences in cases of interpretative injustice are always completely free of
responsibility  for  the  miscommunication.  An  already  unclear  speaker  who's  chances  of  being
understood are  further  undermined by the  audience's  prejudice is  still  at  an unfair  communicative
disadvantage as a result of the audience's prejudice. 
4Consider the following case: A person of colour tries to subtly communicate p, and does
so in such a way that it  might  be unclear even to a reasonable audience that  p was
intended. However, the audience considers persons of colour to be incapable of subtlety,
and so straightforwardly interprets the speaker as asserting q.  In this case although the
speaker's  chances  of  being  understood  were  already  reasonably  low  the  audience's
prejudices lower the chances even further, in a way which is out of the speaker's control.
This is analogous to throwing away someone's lottery ticket on the basis of their race. It
is  unlikely that  they would have won even if  the ticket  had not  been thrown away,
however  their  chances  of  winning  are  still  substantially  and  unfairly  diminished.
Essentially, the act of subtle communication is ruled out (or made far more difficult) for
the person of colour.  One can imagine similar cases in which one is unable to have
humour recognised as humour, or in which artistic divergences from ordinary language
in one's poetry are treated as mere linguistic incompetence.  In all such cases one is
restricted  in  one's  ability  to  use  language  in  a  particular  way  due  to  the  hearer's
prejudices6.
It is also worth considering the relationship between interpretative injustice and silencing
at this point (we will return to the topic of silencing in section five). Many cases of
interpretative injustice are cases of silencing, and many of the harms of interpretative
injustice arise as a result of its ability to silence.  Silencing occurs when an individual or
group is prevented from carrying out a communicative action, either by being prevented
from attempting the action (for example, through intimidation) or as a result of the action
being rendered unsuccessful. Hornsby and Langton (1998) characterise the latter forms
of silencing in terms of the illocutionary or perlocutionary force of the act being blocked.
That is, either the communicative act is prevented from producing its intended outcome
(perlocutionary silencing) or it is prevented from even constituting the intended type of
action  (illocutionary  silencing).  Hornsby and  Langton  maintain  that  in  order  for  an
illocutionary act (for example, an assertion or a refusal) to be carried out the fact that it is
intended to be an assertion or refusal must be recognised by the audience.  So when the
audience fails to recognise the illocutionary act the speaker is attempting the speaker is
illocutionarily silenced. More recently Ishani Maitra7 (2009) has characterised silencing
6 Indeed, the ability of certain groups to use language creatively by coining new words may also be
interpreted as incompetence.  Here we see interpretative injustice contributing to what Fricker calls
'hermeneutical injustice'. 
7 Maitra is not aiming to capture cases of silencing where the speaker is prevented from attempting the
5in Gricean terms.  Grice's conditions on speaker meaning are as follows: 
'A speaker  S means something by uttering x iff, for some audience A,  S utters x
intending: 
(i) A to produce a response r,
(ii) A to think (recognise) that S intends (i); and, 
(iii) A's fulfilment of (ii) to give him a reason to fulfil (i)'
Grice (1989): 92.
Maitra then characterises silencing as follows: 
'In  my view,  a speaker  is  communicatively disables iff  she is  unable to  fully
successfully  perform  her  intended  communicative  act,  because  her  intended
audience fails to satisfy either the second or the third of her (Gricean) intentions.'
Maitra (2009): 327-328 
Most cases of interpretative injustice are cases of silencing by these definitions, since if
one misinterprets  the content  of an utterance then one thereby fails  to  recognise the
illocutionary act being performed, or the speaker's communicative intention8. Indeed the
paradigmatic case of ethically problematic silencing is arguably a case of interpretative
injustice. In the paradigmatic case of silencing a woman tries to refuse a man's sexual
advances by saying 'no'. However, as a result of his misleading conception of women as
wanting  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  promiscuity,  yet  usually  desiring  sex,  he
misinterprets  the  refusal.  He thereby fails  to  recognise  her  communicative  intention.
Thus the woman is prevented from performing the illocutionary act of refusal. In this
case the man's interpretation was guided by a misrepresentation of the speaker's interests,
desires, and intentions based on a harmful stereotype of women. To use Kristie Dotson's
(2011)  phrase,  this  would  be  an  'instance'  of  silencing.   Dotson draws  a  distinction
between instances of silencing and practices of silencing: 
8 These are all forms of what José Medina (2013) calls communicative forms of silencing. They prevent
communication from occurring (or being reciprocated). Medina contrasts communicative and epistemic
forms of silencing,  where epistemic forms of  silencing arise when communication occurs,  but  the
audience fails to treat the speaker as a knower (cases of testimonial injustice in Fricker's sense are cases
of epistemic silencing). Medina argues that the two notions are complimentary, and I agree. Indeed, the
final section of this paper discusses the interaction between interpretative injustice (which gives rise to
a  form  of  communicative  silencing),  and  Fricker's  treatment  of  testimonial  injustice  (a  form  of
epistemic silencing). 
6'An instance of silencing concerns a single, non-repetitive instance of an audience
failing to meet the dependencies of a speaker, whereas a practice of silencing, on
my account, concerns a repetitive, reliable occurrence of an audience failing to
meet  the  dependencies  of  a  speaker  that  finds  its  origin  in  a  more  pervasive
ignorance' Dotson, (2011): 241. 
It appears that, since interpretative injustice silences, and arises systematically as a result
of  shared  social  stereotypes  and  the  mechanisms  of  linguistic  interpretation,
interpretative injustice might also be thought to produce a practice of silencing9. It is not
clear that all cases of interpretative injustice are instances of silencing however, since
silencing is usually characterised in terms of the intended audience failing to properly
reciprocate, and interpretative injustice can occur in cases where the intended audience
fully  reciprocates,  but  an  eavesdropper  misinterprets  the  utterance  with  harmful
consequences10.  As we shall  later  see,  such misinterpretation can still  be harmful (as
there are several harms of interpretative injustice which do not derive from its ability to
silence). 
Since most cases of interpretative injustice seem to  be cases of silencing11 it may be
unclear why interpretative injustice is a worthy topic of investigation in its own right. I
think there are several reasons why it is important to study interpretative injustice as an
independent phenomenon. Firstly, as we will see in section five, interpretative injustice is
associated with its own harms, not brought about simply through its ability to silence12.
Secondly, interpretative injustice complicates our response to epistemic injustice.  This is
9 It is not clear how reliably the silencing must occur for a 'practice of silencing' in Dotson's sense, to
arise.  I do not believe that misinterpretation occurs in all, or even most cases in which marginalised
speaker's interact with non-marginalised speakers. Rather, my claim will be that marginalised testifiers
are subjected to systematic and disproportionate misinterpretation from a common source, and that this
is, in itself, harmful. 
10 It is plausible that in some such cases, where the speaker realises that there is a risk of misinterpretation
by someone other than the intended audience, silencing still arises as a result of self-censorship. That
is,  the  speaker  may  refrain  from  making  an  utterance  for  fear  of  being  misinterpreted  by  an
eavesdropper.  Dotson  (2011)  refers  to  this  style  of  self  censorship  as  'smothering'.   This  will  be
discussed further in section four. 
11 Perhaps all cases, depending on how the notion of silencing is developed to deal with eavesdropper
cases. 
12 This is not to say that the harms discussed in section five are never caused by other forms of silencing.
Rather, interpretative injustice, buy its very nature (and unlike silencing in general), seems particularly
strongly (and systematically) associated with these particular harms. 
7discussed in the final section of the paper. The final (and more general) point is that
although silencing is a unified phenomenon, different types of silencing have different
causes.  In order to be able to find solutions to the problems caused by silencing, and in
order to properly understand the way in which different social  practices silence, it  is
important to have a clear taxonomy of the types of silencing not just in terms of their
effects  (i.e.  whether  they are perlocutionary,  illocutionary etc.),  but  in  terms of their
causes. The phenomenon of interpretative injustice, insofar as it is a form of silencing,
fits  into such a  taxonomy because it  has  a  distinctive  cause -  underlying prejudicial
biases  shaping the  way we interpret  people's  speech.  Other  forms  of  silencing have
different causes,  for example the same biases altering our credibility assessments,  or
more overt prejudices causing us to discount, or try to actively prevent the testimony of
certain groups. Some types of silencing are unified by, for example, being caused by
prejudicial stereotypes.  However, these stereotypes can act in different ways on different
levels of cognition, giving rise to importantly different forms of silencing.  A solution to
one type of silencing will not necessarily generalise to all. 
Finally,  it  is  worth  distinguishing  interpretative  injustice  from  Fricker's  notion  of
hermeneutical  injustice.  Hermeneutical  injustice  is  the  phenomenon  whereby  a
subjugated group is unable to render their experience intelligible either to themselves or
to  others,  due  to  their  lacking  the  concepts  with  which  to  do  so13.  Fricker  uses  the
concept  of  sexual  harassment  as  an  example.  Until  the  notion  of  sexual  harassment
entered into public discourse women who experienced it were restricted in their ability to
communicate  the species  of  wrong they were being subjected to,  or  even identify it
themselves in a clear way (Fricker (2007)). Interpretative injustice does not concern the
existence or the availability of the concepts required to render our social experiences
intelligible. Rather, interpretative injustice occurs when the wrong content is assigned as
a result of prejudicial stereotypes influencing interpretation, regardless of what concepts
are available in our public language. The existence of interpretative injustice is therefore
13 Fricker's  is  not  the  only definition of  hermeneutical  injustice,  Medina (2013) offers  the following
alternative definition:
     'hermeneutical injustice will be treated, roughly, as the kind of injustice that appears when there
are wrongful interpretative obstacles that affect people differently in how they are silenced, that is,
in their inability to express themselves and so to be understood.' Medina (2013): 91. 
Interpretative injustice does fall under Medina's definition of hermeneutical injustice, at least in cases in
which it silences. 
8entirely consistent with the absence of hermeneutical injustice. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  hermeneutical  injustice  and  interpretative  injustice  are  not
importantly  related  in  practice.   As  Gaile  Pohlhaus  Jr  (2012)  argues,  instances  of
hermeneutical injustice are often more complex than they seem on Fricker's model.  The
availability of concepts throughout a linguistic community is not uniform. A concept
might  be  developed  to  render  an  experience  intelligible,  and  this  concept  may  be
available to one subset of the population and not others. This might arise through what
Pohlhaus Jr calls 'wilful hermeneutical ignorance', whereby privileged groups refuse to
draw  on  the  hermeneutical  resources  developed  by marginalised  groups  in  order  to
render their  experiences intelligible,  or it  may arise through the marginalised group's
own efforts. In such cases interpretative injustice is likely to interact with hermeneutical
injustice in important ways. When a speaker invokes a concept which is only available to
a subset of the community their testimony will likely be misinterpreted by anyone who
does not have a grasp on the concept. This misinterpretation arguably has a separate
source  from  interpretative  injustice  (as  discussed  here),  as  such  miscommunication
(which  can  still  be  harmful)  could  arise  without  the  actual  evocation  of  prejudicial
stereotypes in interpretation.  However, in cases where it is known that the language or
conceptual resources are identified with a particular marginalised group, its seems likely
that stereotypes about that group will influence the way in which the communicative
practice is  interpreted by outsiders.  In this  case the resultant misinterpretation would
arise  out  of  a  combination  of  hermeneutical  ignorance  and  interpretative  injustice.
Moreover,  in  many  cases  of  interpretative  injustice  the  conceptual  and  linguistic
resources are at least present for the speaker to correct the audience's misinterpretation.
However, in cases where hermeneutical ignorance is in play speakers will generally lack
the  linguistic  resources  with  which  to  correct  misinterpretations,  thus  these
misinterpretations are more likely to stick. 
3. The Sources of Interpretative Injustice.
It is commonplace to think that we judge a context sensitive term to receive a particular
value in context, a particular proposition to be implied, or loose talk to be resolved in a
particular  way,  by making judgements  about  the conversational  common ground and
mutual salience.  That is,  we make judgements about what information the speaker is
9trying to communicate, and the information to which they expect to appeal, on the basis
of our representation of the speaker's  representation of our mutual goals,  knowledge,
interests,  intelligence,  salience judgements  etc.  However,  it  is  rare  that  we explicitly
reason about the common ground, or about mutual salience.  Rather, like our credibility
judgements, our judgements about what is said or implied are unreflective and intuitive.
We don't explicitly consider the common ground and work out the speaker's meaning in
an effortful step by step manner, rather we rely on quick heuristics and stereotypes in
order  to  quickly  make  a  judgement  about  the  common  ground.   As  in  the  case  of
credibility  judgements  a  hearer's  stereotypes  concerning  social  identity  will  have  an
impact on the judgements reached. For example, a stereotype concerning social identity
could alter the audience's representations of the speaker's likely interests or background
knowledge. 
There is empirical support for the notion that social identity judgements play a role in
semantic processing. For example, Van Berkum et al (2008) found that anomalies with
respect to the social identity of the speaker (such as 'I have a large tattoo on my back',
spoken in an upper class accent, or 'if only I looked like  Britney Spears in her latest
video'  spoken in a male voice) yielded the same type of neural response as semantic
anomalies (such as 'the earth revolves around the trouble in a year'). This suggests that
speaker identity plays a role in semantic interpretation even at the earliest stages. More
recently  Boland  and  Clark  (MS)  found  that  in  linguistic  contexts  which  promote
predictive  processing  audiences  were  able  to  more  quickly  assign  a  referent  to  an
ambiguous term when the referent was associated with the social identity of the speaker
(for example, fingernails were more quickly identified as the referent of 'nails' when the
sentence was spoken in a female voice). Finally, Gieselman and Bellezza (1977) found
that  audiences  judged  the  same  sentence  to  be  more  or  less  'potent'  (a  measure  of
connotative  meaning)  when  spoken  by  male  or  female  respectively.  These  studies
support the view that amongst the stereotypes upon which we rely to recover content are
stereotypes concerning social identity (e.g. class, gender, race etc.). 
It  is  worth considering a  specific  account  of the way in which we assign contextual
values in order to clarify precisely how implicit stereotypes are able to play a role. I use
relevance theory as an example because it is a clear and relatively well known account of
the mechanisms underlying the resolution of context sensitivity. According to relevance
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theory we assess interpretations for relevance, and select the first interpretation to meet
our expectation of optimal relevance.  'Relevance' is a term of art denoting a feature of
inputs  to  cognitive  processes  which  strikes  the  greatest  balance  between  relevant
cognitive  effects  (new  derivable  information,  and  strengthening  or  weakening  of
previous assumptions) and cognitive effort (Sperber and Wilson (1986), Carston (2002)).
That is, when we assign a meaning to a term we rank concepts on the basis of cognitive
activation  and  assess  each  for  relevance.  The  first  concept  to  meet  the  audience's
expectation of relevance is assigned as the meaning of the term. Consider the sentence
'Betty walked to the edge of the cliff and jumped'. Imagine that it is used in a discussion
of Betty's suicide.  The audience may start by assessing the literal meaning of 'jumped',
but  the  resultant  proposition  would  not  meet  their  expectation  of  relevance,  so  they
would  move  on  and  assess  other  candidate  meanings.   The  topic  of  conversation
(suicide) will make the notion of 'jumping of a cliff' salient and will thus be amongst the
potential meanings assessed for relevance. It would meet the audience's expectation of
optimal  relevance,  and so  would  be  assigned as  the  meaning of  'jumped'.  There  are
multiple points at which stereotypes and generalisations based on the speaker's social
identity can enter into and affect this process. For example, an audience's view of the
speaker will affect the level of activation of the various concepts which are ranked in
order to be assessed for relevance. That is, if an audience member associates a particular
concept or topic with a particular race, gender, or social class then a candidate meaning
related to that concept or topic may be assigned a higher initial ranking when the speaker
is a member of that race gender, or social class (consider the example discussed in the
introduction  where  the  stereotype  of  predatory  black  male  sexuality  affects  the
interpretation of 'vulnerable'). Likewise, the cognitive effects taken to be relevant will be
affected by the audience's expectations regarding the aims, interests, and beliefs of the
speaker. 
Indeed, such factors don't just guide us in our resolution of context sensitivity, loose talk,
and  implicature.   By  observing  our  informants  and  making  judgements  about  their
beliefs,  backgrounds,  and interests,  we build  up a  picture of  the  speaker  which  also
guides our expectations regarding what words they are likely to use. There is reason to
think that social identity judgements play a role in speech perception - in our judgements
about the very words spoken.  I am sure every reader will have found themselves in a
situation where they mistook one word for another on the basis of expectations about
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what the speaker was going to say.  For example, picture yourself in a noisy bar talking
to a well groomed, well spoken man in an expensive looking suit.  Suppose he is actually
a social  scientist  (you don't  know this),  and he says  'I  work on current  opinions on
markets'. Due to the noisy environment you could easily mishear him and, partly on the
basis of the expectations you have developed as a result of his appearance, hear him as
saying 'I work on currency options markets'. If he were less well dressed and had a more
working class accent you may mishear him as saying 'I work currently in an open market'
(as in, open air market)14. These are clear cases of social identity judgements leading to
miscommunication (for psychological and linguistic research into the impact of social
information (including social identity judgements) on sentence processing see Casasanto
(2008),  Campbell-Kibler  (2010),  Creel  and  Bergman  (2011),  and  Summner  et  al
(2014))15.
Subpersonal reliance on stereotypes is an important feature of interpretation. We have
already seen that it can lead us astray. One can imagine many ways in which prejudicial
stereotypes in particular can lead to problems. For example, Payne (2002) observed that
white subjects primed with images of black faces were more likely to misclassify an
image of a pair of pliers as an image of a gun. You might imagine a similar situation
arising with speech perception.  For example, one might mistakenly hear a black speaker
as saying 'I've got a gun ', when saying 'I want some gum'. It is not hard to see how such
misinterpretation, if common enough could be very problematic (for example, in cases
involving trigger happy police officers).  One can also imagine cases where someone's
testimony is  not  understood and,  as  a  result  of  prejudicial  stereotypes,  the  audience
assumes  their  testimony  was  irrelevant.  For  example,  imagine  an  unintelligent  and
prejudiced supply teacher covering a social studies class. A black male student invokes
the notion of hegemony whilst making a point. However, the teacher is not aware of the
concept of hegemony, she just assumes that the student is referring to some aspect of
urban culture which has little bearing on the class.  She thereby writes off his testimony.
This would be a case of interpretative injustice since it pertains to the type of content
attributed to the student rather than the teacher's assessment of the student's credibility.
She may take him to be perfectly credible informant with respect to urban culture, but is
14 To be clear, I don't intend this to be taken as a case of interpretative injustice, for no harm is brought
about and the biases leading to the misinterpretation are not prejudicial. 
15 This phenomenon can be seen as analogous to that of cognitive penetration discussed by Siegel (2012,
2013). 
12
simply not interested in such information. 
Clearly  the  problems  just  outlined  are  important  -  the  first  due  to  its  ability  to
disproportionately  subject  certain  groups  to  potentially  harmful  situations,  and  the
second  because  it  constitutes  a  form  of  silencing.  However,  I  would  like  to  focus
primarily on a more general problem raised by prejudicial stereotypes in interpretation.
The problem is simply that, as a result of systematic misleading stereotypes, utterances
by members of certain groups are going to be misinterpreted far more often than the
utterances of other groups. Accurate stereotypes (or, stereotypes which serve as reliable
heuristics)  will  generally  aid  hearers  in  recovering  what  the  speaker  intends  to
communicate,  in the same way that  reasoning based on accurate  generalisations will
usually lead  us  to  the  truth.  However,  if  there  are  popular  stereotypes  about  certain
groups which get  things  radically wrong then the application of  these stereotypes  in
utterance interpretation will lead to these groups being disproportionately misinterpreted.
Reasoning on the basis of faulty generalisations will generally lead to faulty beliefs. 
The problems don't end here though. In her discussion of credibility judgements Fricker
notes  that  stereotypes  of  disadvantaged  groups  have  often  included  negative
generalisations  about  intelligence,  rationality,  and  knowledgeableness.  Disadvantaged
groups are often perceived as unintelligent, irrational, and ignorant. Judgements about
these attributes will determine the charitability of the audience's interpretation. If one's
interpretation  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  audience  is  unintelligent  and  has
various  false  beliefs  then  one's  interpretation  will  be  less  charitable  than  if  one
interpreted on the basis of the assumption that the speaker is a rational and reliable belief
former.  The  result  is  that  members  of  disadvantaged  groups  are  more  likely  to  be
interpreted uncharitably. The fact that certain groups are disproportionately subjected to
uncharitable  interpretation  is  evidenced  by  a  recent  study  by  Alison  Brooks  et  al
(Forthcoming),  which  found  that  potential  investors  systematically  preferred
entrepreneurial by men over identical pitches by women, and that they preferred pitches
by attractive men over identical pitches by unattractive men. Participants were asked to
rate  how  persuasive,  fact  based,  and  logical  the  presentations  were,  and  found
presentations by men (especially attractive men) to rate higher on each scale. Since the
extent to which a presentation is logical or fact based is dependent on the content of the
presentation it seems reasonable to conclude that the gender of the entrepreneur had an
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impact on the way they were interpreted, with males being interpreted more charitably.
Charitability  will  be  especially  relevant  when  we  consider  Fricker's  response  to
testimonial injustice.  First, however, it is worth spending some time considering some
cases of interpretative injustice, and identifying some harms which it brings about. 
4. Instances of Interpretative Injustice.
In section two it was argued that interpretative injustice constitutes an injustice because it
systematically and unfairly harms members of disadvantaged social groups.  We also saw
how the  phenomenon  arises.   However,  we  have  not  yet  explored  any examples  of
interpretative injustice.  This section discusses several examples. 
Firstly, let us consider entrepreneurial pitches, since we have seen that there is empirical
evidence  that  interpretative  injustice  occurs  in  such  scenarios.  Brookes  et  al
(forthcoming) showed that investors preferred identical entrepreneurial pitches by men
(attractive men especially), judging such pitches to be more fact based and logical. The
fact that identical scripts were read, yet different pitches were interpreted to be more or
less fact based/logical suggests that different contents were attributed in each case. But
what sorts of different content attributions could plausibly account for such a preference
for male over female pitches? Let us consider two of the sorts of sentence which may be
spoken in this context.  The entrepreneur is likely to utter sentences such as we aim to
achieve  x  by  2018'  or  'Consumer  data  suggests  x'.  These  sentences  can  each  be
modulated to mean importantly different things.  In the first sentence 'aim to achieve'
could be interpreted as differently as 'we will achieve' to 'we would like to achieve'. In
the second, 'suggests that' could be interpreted strongly, so as to mean something like
'demonstrates/shows that', or weakly, similarly to 'points in the direction of...'. It is easy
to  see  how pitches  where  interpretations  of  the  former  kind  are  favoured  would  be
preferable to investors, as there appears to be far less uncertainty involved. That is, such
pitches  would appear  to  be based on solid  claims rather  than speculation or wishful
thinking.  This  contrasts  with  pitches  where  the  latter  form of  interpretation  is  more
common, where one's investment would seem far more uncertain. We can also see how
investors may be more prone to the latter form of interpretation when viewing pitches by
females.   Where  masculinity  is  often  associated  with  independence,  confidence,  and
groundedness  in  reason/fact,  femininity  is  typically  associated  with  intuitive  and
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emotional  reasoning,  and  with  vulnerability  or  helplessness  (the  'damsel  in  distress'
stereotype). Moreover, if prejudice is common in such contexts some women may be less
confident in the environment.  The result is likely to be that the hedged nature of the
assertions will be more salient to audiences viewing pitches by female entrepreneurs, as
female entrepreneurs may be viewed, in part, as seeking help (rather than offering an
investment opportunity), and their positive claims may be viewed with a greater degree
of  initial  skepticism.  This  gives  male  entrepreneurs  a  significant  communicative
advantage.  In order to communicate the same information a female entrepreneur would
have to hedge her assertions far less, and be far more explicit.  However, the ability to
hedge one's  assertions in such scenarios offers a clear advantage,  because one is  not
forced  to  explicitly  commit  to  things  about  which  there  is  some degree  of  genuine
uncertainty, and it is harder for one to be held to precise claims in the future. 
A second example is as follows: consider a female restaurant manager, Amia, discussing
front  of  house  recruitment  with her  assistant  manager.  This  particular  restaurant  has
developed a highly misogynistic kitchen culture, with many of the chefs (all of whom as
male) questioning the ability of a woman to run a restaurant. Amia is concerned about
the fact that all of the current front of house staff are female, and so she says 'I need a
man'.  The word 'man' here will need to be modulated (narrowed) by the audience, as not
any  old  man  will  do.  Amia's  intended  audience  will  no  doubt  grasp  her  intended
meaning, and modulate 'man' to mean something like 'male with front of house restaurant
competence'. However, imagine that Amia's utterance is overheard by one of the chefs,
who is already skeptical of her ability, as a woman, to run a restaurant. There is a very
real  possibility  that  he  will  modulate  'man'  differently  when  interpreting  Amia's
utterance. That is, drawing on his representation of her as a struggling incompetent and
out of place female manager, he may take her to be saying that she needs a male to help
her run the restaurant, someone to help take charge and add a 'male touch'. In such a case
the  concept  'man'  will  be  narrowed  even  further  to  incorporate  stereotypically  male
qualities associated with strong leadership.  This sort of misinterpretation is likely to
further enforce the kitchen's negative impression of Amia, and make her job even harder. 
Finally, let us consider one of Fricker's central cases: the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper
Lee's 'To Kill  a Mocking Bird'.  Robinson  is a black man falsely accused of rape in
depression  era  Alabama.  Robinson  is  wrongly  convicted  despite  the  fact  that  a
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convincing  case  for  his  innocence  has  been  out  forward.  Fricker  uses  this   as  an
illustrative example in  which  an  audience  (the  jury)  assigns  an inaccurate  degree  of
credibility to the speaker as a result of their prejudicial biases, and the speaker is harmed
as a result. As Fricker notes, in the racial climate of the trial it is very difficult for the
jury to take the word of a black man over that of a white woman, especially in a rape
case. This was, after all,  a period in which there was still  very widespread and open
anxiety about  the sanctity of white  southern womanhood and the supposed threat  of
black male sexuality. Considering the trial of Tom Robinson, and its historical context,
we can come up with clear cases of interpretative injustice. Fricker draws our attention to
a  particular  passage in  which  Robinson is  asked why he visited  his  accuser's  home.
Robinson did so because he felt sorry for his accuser, she seemed to live a lonely sad life,
and he wanted to help. He expresses this by saying that he felt sorry for her. This goes
down very badly. In the climate of the trial the very notion that a black man could feel
sorry for a white woman would be found shocking, and the audience would likely read
into his utterance that he felt superior to her. This, in and of itself, might be seen as a
case of interpretative injustice. However I think we can modify the case to get a clearer
example. Let us suppose that Robinson did not state that he felt sorry for his accuser, but
rather  that  he  visited  her  regularly  because  she  seemed  vulnerable.  Here  the  term
'vulnerable' could be understood in several different ways. As used by Robinson it could
have meant 'in need to help/assistance'. However, in the context of the racist south where
the  dominant  conception  of  black masculinity involved sexual  aggression  (especially
toward white women), as well as being uncontrolled, animalistic, predatory, uncivilised,
and morally inferior, the description of the apparent rape victim as 'vulnerable'  could
easily be seen as him accidentally revealing that he saw her as an easy target16. Indeed, if
he realised his misstep and 'shifted uncomfortably in his chair' (as he does in the book),
this  could  be  taken  as  further  confirmation  that  he  accidentally  revealed  his  true
intentions. 
It might be worried that such a modification of the Tom Robinson case is implausible,
since marginalised groups will generally develop a sensitivity to situations in which their
testimony will fail to secure proper uptake, and where such testimony may be harmful17.
16 One  can  see  how  this  would  fit  into  the  relevance  theoretic  story  given  earlier.   The  relevant
associations of predatory animalistic sexuality will be highly salient to the audience, thus the resultant
concept  of  vulnerability will  receive a higher level  of  activation and  be ranked above Robinson's
intended meaning. 
17 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point. 
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As a result marginalised testifiers will refrain from making such problematic utterances.
Kristie Dotson (2011) calls this form of self censorship 'smothering', and argues that it is
a form of self silencing. Dotson writes: 
'A  linguistic  exchange  that  might  prompt  testimonial  smothering  concerns
situations where unsafe testimony, which is testimony that an audience can easily
fail to find fully intelligible, runs the risk of leading to the formation of false
beliefs  that  can  cause  social,  political,  and/or  material  harm.  In  testimonial
smothering, testimony is omitted that is both unsafe and carries a risk of causing
negative effects by virtue of being unsafe' Dotson (2011): 244. 
Robinson's utterance certainly seems to fit this description. The result is that Robinson
never would have uttered a sentence such as 'she seemed vulnerable' in the trial context,
because  he  would  have  been  well  aware  that  such  an  utterance  would  be  badly
misinterpreted.   Of  course,  the  phenomenon  of  smothering  is  compatible  with
marginalised  speakers  occasionally  slipping  up,  as  Robinson  does  in  Lee's  novel.
However, 'she seemed vulnerable' is arguably a far worse slip up than 'I felt sorry for
her', so it is less likely to occur. I do not think that this renders the modified Robinson
case valueless however. Although it does seem correct that Robinson would be unlikely
to make such an assertion in the context of his trial, it does not seem unlikely that he
would assert  the same sentence in different contexts, where he felt  more secure.  For
example,  suppose  Robinson  is  discussing  his  case  with  someone  he  trusted,  but  is
overheard (or is being eavesdropped on) by a prejudicial interpreter.  In such a situation
Robinson  is  far  less  likely  to  be  on  the  guard  against  misinterpretation,  yet
misinterpretation  by  the  eavesdropper  could  be  equally  harmful.   Moreover,  not  all
marginalised speakers will be equally sensitive to the ways in which they are likely to be
misinterpreted. For example, children, the cognitively impaired, or outsiders who are not
accustomed to the culture of discrimination they are inhabiting will be far less sensitive
to the ways in which they are likely to be misinterpreted18. Thus, such speakers will be
especially vulnerable, even in cases where many marginalised speakers would censor
their own speech. Having considered some cases of interpretative injustice, let us now
18 The case of Emmett Till springs to mind here. Till was a 14 year old African American boy visiting
Mississippi from Chicago in 1955. Till was brutally murdered, and the accounts of the events leading
up to his murder are mixed.  According to some he whistled at a white woman, evidently not realising
the significance of such an act in the context. According to others, he stuttered and spoke with a lisp,
and was thus misheard as whistling. 
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turn to consider some of its distinctive harms. 
5. The Harms of Interpretative Injustice.
Firstly,  as discussed in section two, interpretative injustice silences. For example,  the
paradigmatic  case  of  problematic  silencing,  in  which  a  woman  is  unable  too
communicate  her  refusal  of  a  man's  sexual  advances,  appears  to  be  a  case  of
interpretative injustice, as the man misinterprets her use of 'no'. As emphasised by Ishani
Maitra, the harms of silencing do not end here. She writes: 
'Speech has, at the very least, great instrumental value. It enables us to get what
we want and need, for ourselves and others. It constitutes our first line of defence
against  a  variety  of  injuries,  from  unwanted  sexual  overtures  to  tyrannical
governmental action. And it is essential both to the propagation of knowledge,
and  to  the  proper  functioning  of  a  democratic  society.  When  a  speaker  is
communicatively disabled, she is thereby deprived of these (and other) benefits
that speech can offer' Maitra (2009): 331.
As Maitra points out,  when one is  silenced one is restricted in one's ability to share
knowledge. Fricker, in her discussion of epistemic injustice, emphasised the importance
of the ability to convey knowledge. She argues that the ability to share knowledge is a
fundamental  human value,  and that  when a group is  limited in  their  ability to share
knowledge they are thereby limited in their ability to engage in a practice fundamental to
human value,  and to human society more generally.  If prejudicial  stereotypes lead to
some groups being misinterpreted disproportionately the prejudicial stereotypes make it
harder for these groups to enter into the practice of sharing knowledge. Thus, if Fricker is
right, these stereotype will make it harder for certain groups to engage in social practices
fundamental to human value. Moreover, it will make it harder for these groups to pursue
their ends. Brookes et al (forthcoming) illustrates one particular way in which this could
occur - female entrepreneurs are at a distinct career disadvantage, seemingly as a result
of their tendency to be interpreted uncharitably (at least in certain situations). It is easy
too imagine how the same phenomenon could occur in job interviews, marketing pitches,
and  academic  research  presentations  etc.  In  such  cases  the  female  speaker  will  be
prevented from communicating her intended message, and will be treated as if she has
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attempted to communicate something different. 
Related harms occur when some groups are interpreted overly charitably. In these cases
it is not clear that individuals are directly harmed. However, a practice of systematically
interpreting  some groups  overly charitably will  lead  to  those  groups  having specific
advantages  over  other  groups  in  a  way  that  produces  many  of  the  same  harms  as
silencing.  For  example,  silencing  makes  it  harder  for  members  of  certain  groups  to
advance in their careers. Overly charitable interpretation of one group will likewise make
it  harder for members of other groups to advance in their careers, because it will  be
harder for them to compete.  A possible example of this occurring in philosophy might be
those from prestigious institutions being interpreted more charitably than philosophers
from  lower  ranking  institutions.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  this  could  occur.  Given  the
difficulty of strictly interpreting even the clearest analytic philosophy, there are usually a
few ways  an  argument  can  be  read.  If  our  knowledge  of  the  prestige  of  the  author
influences our interpretation of their argument this will place the author at an advantage
over others who we may interpret less charitably (and perhaps more accurately) as a
result of the status of their institution (race and gender could conceivably lead to the
same form of overly charitable interpretation)19. 
The second harm systematically associated with interpretative injustice involves unjust
attributions  of  responsibility.  When  a  speaker  is  interpreted  as  having  asserted  a
proposition p they are held publicly accountable for defending p.  This fact is emphasised
by MacFarlane (2005, 2011), Hinchman (20005) Goldberg (2006), Rescorla (2009), and
McMyler (2013). Hinchman puts the point as follows: 
'If you've told someone that p, that person is now under certain conditions - for
example,  if  he's  challenged whether  p  -  entitled  to  hold  you  accountable  for
producing a reason to believe that p.' Hinchman (2005): 568. 
Of course, in cases of interpretative injustice the speaker does not actually say what they
are interpreted to have said. So the audience will not actually be entitled to hold the
speaker accountable for having said  p. Nonetheless, if the audience thinks the speaker
19 Of  course,  judgements  based  on  institutional  affiliation  may  not  be  completely  unreliable,  since
philosophical ability has at least some role in candidate job placement. I do not wish to take a stand on
the usefulness of institutional affiliation as a guide to ability here. 
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has said that p they will hold the speaker responsible for p, even if they are not entitled to
do  so.   If  prejudicial  stereotypes  result  in  certain  groups  being  misinterpreted  more
frequently than others then members of these groups will also be disproportionately held
responsible for communicating things they never intended to communicate.  Being held
responsible for something you never did constitutes a harm. 
In combination with other prejudices this could lead to further problems down the line.
In her discussion of credibility judgements Fricker notes that some groups have been
perceived as  inherently dishonest.  If  this  is  the  case  then  the  marginalised  speaker's
ability to correct the audience's mistake may also be harmed. They could be perceived as
being dishonest and trying to slip out of a commitment.  Indeed, if  some groups find
themselves having to correct mistakes in interpretation more often than others this could
add to the perception of that group being sneaky, dishonest, or too ignorant to express
themselves  clearly.  This  in  turn  will  contribute  to  the  stereotype  that  the  group  is
dishonest or stupid. Thus, it will give rise to lowered credibility judgements. It is even
conceivable that such factors  could contribute to stereotype threat -  the phenomenon
whereby individuals  under perform in line with a stereotype when that  stereotype is
made salient to them20. That is, individuals may under perform as communicators when
stereotypes  regarding  their  honesty  or  communicative  abilities  are  salient.  The
plausibility of such a claim will depend on the precise mechanisms of stereotype threat,
and the types of under performance at  issue. For example,  if stereotype threat arises
primarily  through  additional  strain  on  working  memory  then  it  is  unlikely  that
marginalised  speakers  will  be  less  truthful  testifiers  in  cases  where  the  relevant
stereotypes  are  mutually  salient,  but  perhaps  they  will  be  less  clear  (assuming  that
communicating clearly places demands on working memory). However, if factors such
as motivation loss and reduction in effort play an important role in stereotype threat then
it is perhaps plausible that speakers may put less effort into ensuring that the are making
truthful  contributions  when confronted with  negative stereotypes  concerning honesty.
Ultimately this is an empirical question. 
Relatedly, victims of interpretative injustice will be forced to defend themselves against
misinterpretation  (both  during  and  following  communicative  exchanges).  This
experience of having questions raised against oneself, having one's credibility brought
20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to engage with the idea of stereotype threat here. 
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into question, and having to actively re-shape the audience's conception of oneself, will
often be cognitively and emotionally draining, and sometimes humiliating. This will be
especially true of cases in which one's words, which are one's primary means of shaping
the audience's  conception of oneself,  are  at  risk of being misinterpreted and actually
contributing to the conception one is trying to correct21. We can imagine a case similar to
that of Tom Robinson's in which this occurs. Imagine that Robinson is an outsider to the
culture of discrimination in which he finds himself, and describes his reasons for being at
his accuser's home by saying 'she seemed vulnerable'. Asked to clarify what he means by
'vulnerable' he might reply 'well, she seemed like she needed a man'. It is unclear what
should be built into the concept of 'man' here (presumably not any male will do), and it
raises the question of the purpose for which a man is needed.  In this case Robinson
would have meant that his accuser needed the help of someone who was capable of
performing manual labour around the homestead. However, in making this utterance he
would once again be at risk of misinterpretation (due to the very same biases which lead
to  the  misinterpretation  of  'vulnerable').  The  audience's  conception  of  black  men  as
animalistic sexual predators, and their preconceptions of Robinson's likely aims in the
scenario, could lead to him being misinterpreted as stating that his accuser desired a man
fitting the common black male stereotype of the time (perhaps even with the implication
that she desired the rape). This, of course, is far from what Robinson intended.  However,
after  his  two  misinterpreted  utterances  any further  attempts  to  clarify  his  assertions
would likely be taken as attempts to wriggle out of what he has said. I'm sure it is clear to
the reader how humiliating, frustrating, and emotionally draining this experience would
be. We can also imagine a similar continuation of the restaurant manager case. Suppose
Amia says the following to explain her utterance to the chef: 'I can't just have a team of
girls'. If the chef does not appreciate the need for gender balance then he is unlikely to
grasp  Amia's  clarification.   In  such  a  case  his  interpretation  of  the  fact  that  Amia
considers a front of house team incomplete without any males is likely to be influenced
by, and further re-enforce his views about the competencies of women in the workplace.
The  cumulative  cognitive  and  emotional  stress  of  living  in  a  society  in  which  one
struggles  to  be  heard,  and  in  which  it  is  more  difficult  for  one  to  use  language  in
particular ways (e.g. use of subtlety, artistic language use, or the use of commands), is a
21 Of course, the humiliation of trying to defend oneself, and the cognitive drain associated with being
heard,  will  be  systematically associated  with  other  forms of  silencing.  What  is  not  systematically
correlated with other types of silencing is the cause (being unfairly held responsible for something one
never intended to communicate), or the fact that one's only means for improving the situation (one's
words) can be twisted in such a way as to worsen the situation. 
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harm which arises from the silencing aspect of interpretative injustice  Thus, the first two
harms are in this way intertwined. 
Finally, if members of certain groups are interpreted uncharitably more frequently than
others then this will contribute to the stereotype that members of those groups are poor
informants, thereby feeding into the stereotypes which give rise to prejudicial credibility
judgements.  Consider  the following:  we have  two informants,  Max and Sally.  If  we
frequently interpret Sally uncharitably so that, for example, we take her to be asserting
that  p where  p is less plausible than some alternative interpretation  q which we would
assign to Max in the same circumstances, then the following situations will arise more
frequently with respect to Sally than with respect to Max: A) we find Sally's utterance so
initially implausible that we lower our judgement of her credibility22, and B) we believe
her only to later discover that the proposition we took her to be asserting was false,
which once again leads to us to lower our judgement of her credibility.  Therefore, as a
result of our uncharitable interpretations of Sally we will find ourselves with what seem
like good reasons for assigning Max a higher credibility than Sally, even though he may
be no better as an informant. 
If audiences make credibility judgements on the basis of the speaker's social identity, and
the speaker's social identity is a partial determiner of the charitability of the audience's
interpretation,  then  that  audience  will  find  themselves  in  situations  A and  B  more
frequently with respect to the testimony of certain social groups than others. This will
thereby strengthen the stereotype that particular groups have a low credibility, and thus
contribute to prejudicial credibility judgements. We can imagine this occurring in the
context of entrepreneurial pitches as discussed above. If an investor frequently has the
impression that female entrepreneurs present weaker, less coherent and more illogical
pitches, then they may come to the belief that female entrepreneurs are generally not
very intelligent or reliable.  As a result they may assign a lower credibility to certain
22 It might be thought that we would not assign initially implausible interpretations if we are taking the
Gricean maxims to be in effect.  This would be a mistake.  When applying Gricean norms you need to
represent what would be a cooperative contribution given the speaker's representation of the situation.
For example, imagine you know that p, and believe that the speaker doesn't know that p. If the speaker
were to make an assertion which would imply q only if p was common knowledge, then you would not
take them to be implying q.  If you take the speaker's representation of the communicative situation to
be defective then the contribution you take the speaker to be making will not be the most  cooperative
given the actual  facts,  but  rather  the most  cooperative given a particular  set  of faulty background
assumptions. And this contribution may seem implausible. 
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assertions made by female entrepreneurs,  for example assertions which concern their
ability  to  carry  out  particular  projects.   Thus  interpretative  injustice  contributes  to
epistemic injustice. 
So  far  everything I  have  said  can  be  seen  as  supplementary to  Fricker's  account  of
epistemic injustice. In the final section I argue that the two phenomena interact in an
important  way.   More precisely,  I  argue that  adopting Fricker's  proposed solution  to
testimonial injustice without also treating interpretative injustice will cause the hearer to
be epistemically harmed, with only minimal benefit to the speaker. 
6. Interpretative Injustice and Credibility Adjustments.
Fricker does not merely identify and describe the phenomenon of epistemic injustice.
She also offers a strategy for overcoming it. She argues that the appropriate response to
epistemic injustice is to develop the virtue of testimonial justice, whereby we gain a
sensitivity to the sorts of situations in which our credibility judgements may be biased,
and re-consider our judgements in such circumstances. In such situations we should not
rely  on  our  quick  intuitive  judgements,  but  should  try  to  make  an  accurate  and
unprejudiced judgement.  Fricker puts the point as follows: 
'When the hearer suspects prejudice in her credibility judgement-whether through
sensing  cognitive  dissonance  between  her  perception,  beliefs,  and  emotional
responses,  or  whether  through  self-conscious  reflection  -  she  should  shift
intellectual gear out of spontaneous, unreflective mode and into active critical
reflection in order to identify how far the suspected prejudice has influenced her
judgement. If she finds that the low credibility judgement she has made of the
speaker  is  due  in  part  to  prejudice,  then  she  can  correct  this  by revising  the
credibility upwards to compensate. There can be no algorithm for her to use in
determining how much it should be revised upwards, but there is a clear guiding
ideal. The guiding ideal is to neutralize any negative impact of prejudice in one's
credibility  judgements  by  compensating  upwards  to  reach  the  degree  of
credibility that  would have  been given were  it  not  for  the  prejudice.'  Fricker
(2007): 91-92.
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The hope is that we eventually become more reliable habitual judges of credibility, and
that prejudicial stereotypes will no longer affect our credibility judgements. At this point
we  will  display   an  instinctive  sensitivity  to  actual  signs  that  the  speaker  has  low
credibility and not judge speakers to have low credibility on the basis of factors such as
race and gender. 
It might be thought that developing the virtue of testimonial justice would make us more
reliable belief formers. For example, suppose that on reflection I realise that I have an
underlying bias against a particular race, and that I assign members of that race a lower
credibility than I should. Next time I have an interaction with a member of that race I
actively reconsider  my intuitive credibility judgement,  and compensate upwards.  The
effect  of  this  is  that  the  speaker  is  no  longer  prevented  from communicating  their
knowledge to me, and I no longer miss out on knowledge I can acquire from the speaker.
This  solution  becomes  less  straightforward  once  interpretative  injustice  is  taken into
account.  Consider  the  case  of  Max  and  Sally  from the  previous  section.  However,
imagine that in this case we have not only been interpreting Sally uncharitably, but have
also  been assigning her  a  low credibility,  and thus  not  trusting  her  testimony.  After
reading Fricker's 'Epistemic Injustice' and reflecting on the way we assign credibility we
realise that we have been assigning Sally a low credibility on the basis of prejudicial
stereotypes. As a result we no longer trust our intuitive credibility judgements.  Instead
we actively reason about  her  credibility.  Sometimes  this  results  in  our  rejecting  her
testimony for reasons other than prejudicial bias. However, on other occasions it results
in us compensating upwards and assigning her a high degree of credibility. That is, in
many cases when Sally makes an utterance and we take her to be asserting a proposition
p, we go against our instinctive (but prejudicial) credibility judgement and assign her a
higher  credibility,  thereby leading  us  to  believe  p.  Certainly  we  will  find  ourselves
believing  what  we  take  Sally  to  have  said  more  often  than  we  would  have  done
otherwise. 
It  should  be  clear  why  this  will  lead  too  problems  if  we  do  not  also  adjust  for
interpretative  injustice.  Consciously  assigning  Sally  a  higher  credibility  will  not
necessarily affect the charitability of our interpretation23. The practice of assigning high
23 It is perhaps a matter of contingent empirical fact that the practice of actively adjusting one's credibility
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credibility to uncharitably interpreted utterances will lead to unreliable belief formation,
and  will  thus  be  harmful  to  the  hearer.  Moreover,  in  the  cases  where  Sally  is
misinterpreted she will still be blocked from sharing her knowledge. The audience will
bear an epistemic cost which is of little benefit to the speaker. This result applies more
generally.  If  we  treat  epistemic  injustice  in  the  way  Fricker  suggests,  without  also
treating interpretative injustice, then in many cases we run the risk of not only continuing
to harm the speaker, but also harming ourselves. 
To be clear, I am not claiming that Fricker's solution fails to treat testimonial injustice. if
we raise our credibility assignments then we will avoid disrespecting the speaker as a
knower. Thus one of the main harms of testimonial injustice will be removed. Rather, my
point is cautionary. Treating testimonial injustice in the way Fricker suggests without
also  also  treating  interpretative  injustice  will,  in  cases  where  both  interpretative  and
testimonial  injustice  are  present,  put  the  hearer  at  epistemic  risk,  and  only  make  a
minimal positive difference to the speaker. 
It might be thought that this is unproblematic, since the virtue of testimonial justice can
be applied earlier on in the process of testimonial belief formation. This will involve
applying one's sensitivity to one's own underlying biases in order to recognise not only
situations in which one's credibility judgements are misleading, but also cases in which
ones  interpretation  may  be  rendered  defective.   Once  such  a  sensitivity  has  been
developed one can adjust one's interpretation accordingly. This will involve shifting gear
from being a passive spontaneous interpreter to being an active interpreter, and perhaps
applying a heuristic similar to Fricker's 'adjust credibility upward' heuristic. 
The  first  point  to  note  here  is  that  the  problem raised  above  was  only  intended  to
illustrate the risks for treating testimonial injustice without also treating interpretative
injustice.  If one shifted gear earlier  on then one would not be ignoring interpretative
injustice. Thus, there is no tension with the point above. However, there are two further
points which indicate that it may be less straightforward to shift gears with respect to
one's interpretation than it is to do so with respect to one's credibility judgements. The
first (minor) point is simply that although the processes underlying both interpretation
judgements will eventually change one's overall perspective of the speaker, which will also solve the 
problem of interpretative injustice.  However it is an empirical question (to which we don't have an 
answer) whether this will be the case. 
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and  credibility  judgements  are  subpersonal,  credibility  judgements  seem more  easily
accessible to consciousness. We are more used to actively reasoning about a speaker's
credibility  during  conversational  exchanges  than  we  are  to  reasoning  about  how  to
interpret them. 
The second point is that credibility judgements seem to be scalar in a way in which
interpretation is  not.  That is,  it  might be thought that  our credibility judgements  fall
somewhere on a scale, and in order to adjust our judgements we must merely shift where
we locate the speaker's utterance on that scale.  With interpretation there are multiple
possible meanings that need to be ranked for plausibility given our knowledge of the
context. Thus, the task of adjusting interpretation cannot be reduced to a simple heuristic
such as 'shift credibility upward'. This is not to say that such heuristics are of no use at
all.  For  example,  our  credibility  adjustments  may  affect  the  charitability  of  our
interpretation.  Thus,  employment  of  a  heuristic  such as  'adjust  credibility upward'  if
made before the utterance actually takes place, may lead to more charitable interpretation
(at least in cases where the audience's negative credibility judgement would have lead to
misinterpretation   had  it  not  been  corrected).   However,  due  to  the  complex  and
multifaceted nature of interpretation such simple heuristics will only take us so far. 
If a heuristic based approach is to be adopted, we may be better off adopting an approach
similar  to  that  offered  by  Karen  ones  (2002).  Jones  notes  that  we  should  separate
credibility  judgements  from  our  judgements  regarding  the  prior  probability  of  the
asserted contents, as the credibility we assign can affect the probability we judge the
asserted content to have. The result is that in cases where audiences make prejudicial
credibility judgements  they are likely to  also  assign a  lower prior  probability to  the
content of the testimony. The same seems to be true with interpretative injustice. The
credibility we assign can have an impact on the way we interpret the speaker. Indeed,
this may be one of the mechanisms by which credibility assessments affect judgements
of  prior  probability.   That  is,  there  are  two  ways  in  which  we  might  think  of  the
interaction between credibility assessments and the assignment of prior probability to
asserted  contents.  We  could  hold  the  asserted  content  p fixed  and  maintain  that
credibility assessments affect our judgement regarding the prior probability of  p (this
seems  possible,  and  I  take  it  to  be  what  Jones  has  in  mind),  or  a  low  credibility
judgement  could cause us to  interpret  the speaker  as  saying something to  which we
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antecedently assign a low prior probability. This could occur as a result of interpretative
injustice  (indeed,  it  may be  that  the  probabilities  we assign  to  asserted  contents  are
sometimes affected in both these ways). However, credibility judgements are only one
potential  factor  which  may  bias  interpretation.  Moreover,  accurate  credibility
judgements,  and  some  social  identity  judgements,  may  be  fruitfully  employed  in
interpretation. Thus merely separating credibility assessments and interpretation does not
seem a  promising  strategy.  Another  of  Jones's  heuristics  seems  to  offer  us  a  more
promising route. Jones's third heuristic for making credibility judgements calls for one to
seek more corroborating evidence when it is less reasonable for one to trust one's own
ability to judge the credibility of particular sorts of speaker. A similar strategy might be
employed to deal with interpretative injustice. That is, one might attempt to develop a
sensitivity to the kind of case in which it is less reasonable for one to trust one's own
interpretation, and employ more evidence (or, more active reflective reasoning) when
interpreting in such cases. This will not entirely solve the problem as the employment of
such  heuristics  will  place  higher  cognitive  demands  on  audiences  when  interpreting
marginalised speakers. As a result, employment of such heuristics will still leave certain
groups at a communicative disadvantage compared to those for whom no adjustment is
needed. However, such an approach may be the lesser of two evils. 
Conclusion.
I have introduced the notion of interpretive injustice and explained the numerous harms
to which it gives rise. It gives rise to silencing, unjust attributions of responsibility, and it
contributes to the stereotypes which give rise to epistemic injustice in our credibility
judgements.  Finally,  I  discussed  the  relationship  between  interpretative  injustice  and
Fricker's proposed treatment of testimonial injustice. This discussion is instructive as we
start  to  think  about  how we might  treat  interpretative  injustice.  Fricker's  solution  to
testimonial  injustice  may  be  thought  of  as  having  two  components.  Firstly,  she
recommends  that  we  develop  a  sensitivity  to  the  biases  which  play  a  role  in  our
credibility  judgements,  and  secondly  she  recommends  that  we  adjust  our  credibility
judgements upward in situations where we suspect that our credibility judgements may
be  influenced by such biases.  I  have  argued that  interpretative  injustice  complicates
Fricker's  proposed solution.  I  agree that  developing a sensitivity to  the biases  which
guide  one's  behaviour  (both  in  interpretation  and  credibility  judgements)  will  be  an
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important factor in a treatment of both interpretative and testimonial injustice. However,
simply  raising  the  credibility  one  assigns  to  the  speaker,  in  cases  where  one's
interpretation is uncharitable, fails to prevent silencing, and it also epistemically harms
the audience. Raising one's credibility judgement before interpretation has taken place
will  help  insofar  as  misinterpretation  arises  from  stereotypes  associated  with  the
credibility of the informant. However, the factors which contribute to interpretation are
not identical to those which contribute to credibility assignments, and they may vary
between contexts. So application of Fricker's proposed heuristic prior to interpretation
will not solve the problem of interpretative injustice either (indeed, it was not designed
to do so).  Thus, interpretative and testimonial injustice should be treated together, and
the treatment of interpretative injustice requires a new heuristic. Moreover, it seems that
whatever heuristic  we apply will  have to be somewhat  different in form to Fricker's
'adjust upward' heuristic, as interpretation is multifaceted and non-scalar. A heuristic such
as  'evoke  more  evidence  in  interpretation'  (similar  to  Jones's  (2002)  third  rule  for
credibility assignments) seems more appropriate. However, heuristics along these lines
differ  from Fricker's  heuristic  in  an  important  way -  they  are  far  more  cognitively
demanding. Thus, application of the heuristic will be, in some ways, detrimental to the
audience24,  and may also be detrimental to speakers. That is,  if  audiences from non-
marginalised groups are under a  heavier cognitive burden when communicating with
marginalised speakers than with speakers from their own community then this itself will
put marginalised speakers at a disadvantage. This may simply be the lesser of two evils.
However,  if  we  develop  a  sensitivity  not  only  to  the  types  of  bias  which  guide
interpretation, but also to the sorts of situation in which misinterpretation is likely to be
particularly harmful, then we may be able to avoid some of the most harmful forms of
misinterpretation  without  placing  cognitive  demands  on  audiences  that  are  more
detrimental than helpful. That is, we must adjust the amount of evidence appealed to in
interpretation not just as a function of the chance of error, but also as a function of the
costs of error25. 
24 See Szabó Gendler (2011) for a discussion of the cognitive and epistemic costs of adjusting for implicit
bias.
25 Developing such a sensitivity will not only involve considering direct harms which may result from 
particular misinterpretations, but also considering the ways in which particular subtle and widespread 
misinterpretations contribute to systematic disadvantage. Doing so may not be simple, as the harms of 
such misinterpretations will often be hidden to those who inflict them. Thus, as suggested by Medina 
(2013), a development of such a sensitivity may involve active engagement with different perspectives 
and social movements. 
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